stuxnet

Recently I saw a posting on LinkedIn asking “What’s the difference between a SCADA system and an ICS system, and if there is no difference, then why do we have two different names?”

This is a good question, because unless you have worked in the industrial automation field for a few decades, the terminology can seem very confusing. Not only do we have SCADA versus ICS, we also have terms like Process Control, Discrete Control, Industrial Automation, Manufacturing Automation Systems, Distributed Control Systems, Energy Management Systems and so on.

Editor's Note: This is an updated version of this article, which was first published on June 14, 2011.

Finding a way to determine the right level of investment in ICS and SCADA Security has been an ongoing challenge for industry. In an earlier article the Total Cost of Ownership approach for calculating investment level was described. Today I present another method called Value at Risk (VaR).

Engineers as well as IT staff in the process control and SCADA industries have varying levels of knowledge about industrial cyber security. We come across this regularly when talking to people at industry events or speaking with customers or partners. To help you, no matter where you are in the learning curve, we have recently released a five-part video series.

This article summarizes the videos and provides you with direct access to them.

This is an excerpt from the Think Forward blog at verizonbusiness.com

In a move that may be helpful for critical infrastructure asset owners, on July 23  the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group (ICSJWG) published a new document on a framework for disclosing Industrial Control System (ICS) vulnerabilities.

Editor's Note:  This is an updated version of this article, which was first published on June 30, 2011

Did Iran really detect a planned "massive cyber attack" against its nuclear facilities, as reported by Reuters last week? And, have they really “taken [the] necessary measures” to contain it?

The discovery of the Flame malware last week focused the cyber security world on the sophisticated strikes targeting energy companies in the Middle East. Although Flame’s goal was espionage rather than damaging operations as Stuxnet did, it has been seen as one more indication that the industrial world is now in the bull’s eye of clever attackers.

Over the weekend a new super worm exploded onto the cyber security landscape. Known as Flame or sKyWIper, it appears to be targeting sites in the Middle East, just like the Stuxnet and Duqu worms did. But what does it have to do with SCADA or ICS security? At this stage the answer appears to be nothing and…everything.

Recently I wrote about one of the fundamentals of industrial cyber security, which is the concept of Defense in Depth.

Today I am going to write about another foundation concept, which goes hand-in-hand with Defense in Depth, and that is using ANSI/ISA-99 Standards to improve control system security.

Factors that have degraded Control Network Security

There are two opposing trends impacting control network design today:

Last year I published two articles titled “Getting Started on ICS and SCADA Security” (Part 1 and Part 2).  As a result of their popularity, I have worked with John Cusimano of exida to develop the material further.  The result is the white paper that we are releasing today titled “7 Steps to ICS and SCADA Security”.  This ar

Late last year Frost and Sullivan, an international analyst group, released a short report called “Current Scenario and Future Landscape in the Automation & Control Systems (ACS) Market.” The report claims that “the field of industrial automation is at a cross roads,” due to “narrowing product definition between individual ACS products, specifically the PLC and DCS product line.”

The Oscar season is upon us and instead of predicting who will win Academy Awards I am writing today to talk about what I see in my “Crystal Ball” for 2012.

Today is the day that Tofino Security is announcing that I have joined their team.  I am very excited about this, particularly because I believe that industrial cyber security is the next major impactful technology to hit the automation industries.

I am also excited to be joining Eric and Joann Byres and their group; people I have high regard for, as I believe Tofino Security technology is poised to lead the way in protecting the critical infrastructure industries.

Today is a big news day for Byres Security Inc. (BSI), as we are announcing that our company has been acquired by Belden Inc.

We (Joann Byres and Eric Byres) are writing this article to let you know what the future has in store for us, and for our company.

The Siemens Automation Summit was held last week and both Joel Langill and I attended it, presented at it, and engaged in social media commentary regarding it.  This article will summarize our opinion of Siemens’ announcements and posture regarding cyber security as we reflected on the conference.  We assign grades to various aspects of Siemens’ cyber security measures or policies, and we will sum it up with a final grade at the end of Part 2.

Last week in his blog article, Fix the Problem, Stop Bailing out Vendors, Dale Peterson made an impassioned statement that the SCADA security community:

“needs to put all our efforts and emphasis in the PLC, RTU, controller space on getting vendors to add basic security features to their models available for sale today… We should not say or pretend that any other solution besides this is acceptable. Fix the problem!”

In the past two months, the number of serious security vulnerabilities being reported in SCADA and ICS products has sky rocketed. In late March, I blogged about how Luigi Auriemma published 34 vulnerabilities (with free exploit code) for 4 popular HMI packages.