stuxnet

With the last post from Eric and Joann Byres below, this blog is now closed.  However, Belden continues to publish ICS security articles at the Industrial Security blog on Belden.com. 

This blog is the last one from me as a member of the company that manufactures and sells Tofino Security products. Joann Byres (Tofino co-founder and Belden Vice President) and I are retiring from the Tofino Security group at Belden effective January 30, 2015.

The age of malware specifically targeting industrial control systems (ICS) began in 2010 when Stuxnet was revealed to be disrupting operations at one of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Since that shock, we have seen advanced malware, such as Flame and Duqu, target energy companies for espionage purposes.

Our last blog, contributed by Thomas Nuth, highlighted the fact that industrial cyber security is now being discussed by heads of state within the international community - the Executive Order – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity signed by President Obama in February of this year being just one indication of the importance being attached to th

If you have read my previous blogs on patching for control system security, you might think I am completely against patching. Guess what? I’m not against them!

In my last blog, I discussed the reasons why critical industrial infrastructure control systems are so vulnerable to attacks from security researchers and hackers, and explained why patching for such systems is not a workable solution.

As regular readers of this blog know, after Stuxnet, security researchers and hackers on the prowl for new targets to exploit shifted their efforts to critical industrial infrastructure.

Unfortunately, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) applications they are now focusing on are sitting ducks.

Last week I received am email (shown further down on this page) purporting to be from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

January is the Cruelest Month

Early in 2012 Eric Byres wrote a blog article predicting what he thought would happen in 2012 with regards to SCADA and ICS security. I went back to his blog and highlighted the four main predictions he made. Then I asked him to rate himself on each one.

Editor's Note

Last year Eric’s holiday gift suggestion got his culinary juices flowing with the idea of a sous-vide oven; or for the true controls engineer, the plans to build your own. He was pleasantly surprised a few weeks later, when a sous-vide oven arrived under the tree.

“Lacking extravagant IT budgets, automation systems also require cyber security systems that just work, with a minimum of human intervention.”

Who is responsible for fixing the thousands (some say 100,000) of vulnerabilities that exist in PLCs, DCS, RTUs and other automation devices that are in use in facilities around the world?

On the one hand, we have the position of Dale Peterson at Digital Bond. Dale ardently argues for (and takes) aggressive measures to pressure ICS vendors into making their products more secure. Through their 2012 Project Basecamp and subsequent disclosures, Digital Bond publically released vulnerability details for a large number of controllers.

In last week's blog, Heather wrote an excellent summary of Mark Cooksley's network security presentation regarding "Why Industrial Networks are Different than IT Networks". In it she noted that the number one goal of ICS security is based on the concern for safety. This is spot-on in my opinion. However, there is more to consider when it comes to industrial security priorities…

Previously we looked at the question of “Why are PLCs so insecure?” Today we are going to come at SCADA security from another angle, which is “Why is securing Industrial Networks different than securing IT Networks?” We will also look at three ways to address these differences.

Ed. Note: This is a significant update to an article first published on Sept 25, 2012. The original article is available as a download in Related Links.

Last week I wrote about a serious issue in the patching of SCADA and ICS systems. Just when you think you are installing all needed patches, some critical ones are getting missed.

To understand the problems faced by SCADA users, the team at Regency IT Consulting wanted to build a basic test rig. The goal with the rig was to help us understand the users’ challenges and to interact with the technology and protocols.

Last week Eric Byres addressed the difference between SCADA, ICS and other jargon in our industry. This week I am going to address a question I am often asked “Why are industrial networks so hard to secure?” This is a big topic, so today I will address only “Why are PLCs so Insecure?”