How Stuxnet Spreads – A Study of Infection Paths in Best Practice Systems
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The Stuxnet worm is a sophisticated piece of computer malware designed to sabotage industrial processes controlled by Siemens SIMATIC WinCC and PCS 7 control systems.
This paper describes an example of a site following high security architecture best practices and then shows the ways that the worm could make its way through the defences of the site to take control of the process and cause physical damage.
The paper closes with a discussion of the lessons that can be learned from the analysis of Stuxnet’s propagation pathways. It explains how owners of critical systems need to respond to protect control systems from future threats of this type.
Download the White Paper
How Stuxnet Spreads - A Study of Infection Paths in Best Practice Systems, version 1.0 (5MB)
Authors:
Eric Byres, CTO, Tofino Security
Andrew Ginter, CTO, Abterra Technologies
Joel Langill, CSO, SCADAhacker.com
Important Note:
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Related Links
- Press Release for this White Paper
- News articles related to Stuxnet
- Stuxnet Central - a hub of information about Stuxnet
- Abterra Technologies website
- SCADAhacker website
ISSSource.com has a series of articles about this White Paper:
- Stuxnet Report: A System Attack
- Stuxnet Report II: A Worm's Life
- Stuxnet Report III: Worm Selects Site
- Stuxnet Report IV: Worm Slithers In
- Stuxnet Report V: Security Culture Needs Work
White Paper: Abstract
The Stuxnet worm is a sophisticated piece of computer malware designed to sabotage industrial processes controlled by Siemens SIMATIC WinCC and PCS 7 control systems. It includes many advanced injection, infection, attack, and masking techniques. The worm uses both known and previously unknown vulnerabilities to spread, and is powerful enough to evade state-of-the-practice security designs, including the security architecture recommended by Siemens for their control systems.
This paper describes an example of a site following the high security architecture and best practises as defined in current control system vendor guidance documents. It then shows the ways that the Stuxnet worm could make its way through the defences of the site to take control of the process and cause physical damage. Since the majority of real world industrial sites are less thoroughly protected than the hypothetical site, this analysis presents a best case rather than worse case situation.
The paper closes with a discussion of the lessons that can be learned from the analysis of Stuxnet’s propagation pathways. It explains how owners of critical systems need to respond to protect control systems from future threats of this type.